KEY TAKEAWAYS Volexity has observed multiple Russian threat actors conducting social-engineering and spear-phishing campaigns targeting organizations with the ultimate goal of compromising Microsoft 365 accounts via Device Code Authentication phishing. Device Code Authentication phishing follows an atypical workflow to that expected by users, meaning users may not recognize it as phishing. Recent campaigns observed have been politically themed, particularly around the new administration in the United States and the changes this might mean for nations around the world. Starting in mid-January 2025, Volexity identified several social-engineering and spear-phishing campaigns by Russian threat actors aimed at compromising Microsoft 365 (M365) accounts. These attack campaigns were highly targeted and carried out in a variety of ways. The majority of these attacks originated via spear-phishing emails with different themes. In one case, the eventual breach began with highly tailored outreach via Signal. Through its investigations, Volexity discovered that Russian threat actors were impersonating […]
phishing
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Multiple Russian Threat Actors Targeting Microsoft Device Code Authentication
February 13, 2025
by Charlie Gardner, Steven Adair, Tom Lancaster
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CharmingCypress: Innovating Persistence
February 13, 2024
by Ankur Saini, Callum Roxan, Charlie Gardner, Damien Cash
Through its managed security services offerings, Volexity routinely identifies spear-phishing campaigns targeting its customers. One persistent threat actor, whose campaigns Volexity frequently observes, is the Iranian-origin threat actor CharmingCypress (aka Charming Kitten, APT42, TA453). Volexity assesses that CharmingCypress is tasked with collecting political intelligence against foreign targets, particularly focusing on think tanks, NGOs, and journalists. In their phishing campaigns, CharmingCypress often employs unusual social-engineering tactics, such as engaging targets in prolonged conversations over email before sending links to malicious content. In a particularly notable spear-phishing campaign observed by Volexity, CharmingCypress went so far as to craft an entirely fake webinar platform to use as part of the lure. CharmingCypress controlled access to this platform, requiring targets to install malware-laden VPN applications prior to granting access. Note: Some content in this blog was recently discussed in Microsoft’s report, New TTPs observed in Mint Sandstorm campaign targeting high-profile individuals at universities and […]
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Charming Kitten Updates POWERSTAR with an InterPlanetary Twist
June 28, 2023
by Ankur Saini, Charlie Gardner
Volexity works with many individuals and organizations often subjected to sophisticated and highly targeted spear-phishing campaigns from a variety of nation-state-level threat actors. In the last few years, Volexity has observed threat actors dramatically increase the level of effort they put into compromising credentials or systems of individual targets. Spear-phishing campaigns now often involve individual, tailored messages that engage in dialogue with each target, sometimes over a period of several days, before a malicious link or file attachment is ever sent. One threat actor Volexity frequently sees employing these techniques is Charming Kitten, who is believed to be operating out of Iran. Charming Kitten appears to be primarily concerned with collecting intelligence by compromising account credentials and, subsequently, the email of individuals they successfully spear phish. The group will often extract any other credentials or access they can, and then attempt to pivot to other systems, such as those accessible […]
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OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites
November 6, 2020
by Steven Adair, Tom Lancaster, Volexity Threat Research
Since Volexity’s 2017 discovery that OceanLotus was behind a sophisticated massive digital surveillance campaign, the threat group has continued to evolve. In 2019, Volexity gave a presentation at RSA Conference that provided a historic and up-to-date look at various operations of the Vietnamese threat actor OceanLotus. Notably, the presentation revealed that, for years, OceanLotus set up and operated multiple activist, news, and anti-corruption websites. At first glance, it appeared these were real websites that had been compromised. These fake websites were convincingly legitimate and allowed OceanLotus to have full control over the tracking of and attacks against website visitors. The most popular of these websites even had a corresponding Facebook page with over 20,000 followers. Shortly after the presentation was given, these websites were shut down or abandoned. However, old habits and successful techniques die hard. Volexity has identified multiple new attack campaigns being launched by OceanLotus via multiple fake […]